AEM Sites Playbook, Chapter 8: Identity, permissions, security and privacy
Who may perform each action, and how is that authority enforced?
November 10, 2026
Map actions to identities and resources
Use this chapter when granting access, protecting content, exposing an API or investigating denied operations. List the identities involved: author, approver, publisher, developer, administrator, visitor and integration account. For each, record the resource and permitted action. Creating content, deploying code and restoring an environment are different authorities.
Assess authentication, which establishes the caller, separately from authorization, which permits an action. Repository privileges, CUG evaluation, product profiles, Cloud Manager roles and delivery-layer controls can affect different parts of a request. Map the real path before changing one of them.
The LTS SP2 CUG replication discussion includes an author-reported result using CugExcludeImpl. Adobe's LTS CUG reference documents principalNames for that configuration. An exclusion affects CUG evaluation and must be assessed alongside repository privileges; it is not a page-local permission recipe. Use a dedicated identity and positive/negative tests rather than production administrator membership as a repair.
Verify cumulative authority
For Cloud Service Cloud Manager, custom permissions can scope actions to programs, environments and pipelines. Review every assigned profile, not only the profile created for the new requirement. The environment-permission discussion contains an accepted blanket limitation that is outdated relative to current documentation. Resource-scoped permission support still does not guarantee that every UI tile can be hidden.
Similarly, current Universal Editor customization includes an unpublish disable value. The older discussion should not lead to unnecessary extension work. A hidden or disabled control remains a UI configuration; independently test whether the user can perform the operation through another allowed route.
Protect the request and the data
Inventory public and private endpoints, exposed fields, credentials, uploads and personal data flowing into logs or integrations. Decide which information the visitor actually needs. For personalized or protected content, test isolation through the delivery path and caches with representative identities.
Keep CORS, CSRF, authentication and Dispatcher/CDN filtering distinct. Adobe's CSRF guidance describes a request-protection concern; it does not replace authorization. A failed request needs diagnosis at the failing layer, not a blanket removal of protections. In the App Builder authorization discussion, a custom servlet did not resolve rejection before its internal service identity was used.
Store secrets in the approved mechanism for the target deployment, restrict access, identify rotation/revocation owners and sanitize shared diagnostics. Confirm SSO joiner/mover/leaver behavior with the identity team. For 6.5, use its security checklist and supported-release guidance. Assess Cloud Service responsibilities using its applicable documentation and the organization's arrangement rather than copying infrastructure commands from another branch.
Diagnose the authority boundary before expanding access
Community discussions about permissions span different products and identity boundaries. An author-reported CUG configuration result in AEM 6.5 LTS SP2 cannot establish Cloud Manager permissions or Universal Editor controls. Check current documentation for the relevant product, then test the intended identity and resource scope before concluding that a capability is absent or broader access is required.
Scroll horizontally if needed.
| Symptom | Boundary to inspect | Evidence to retain |
|---|---|---|
| User cannot sign in | Identity provider, account provisioning and target environment | Supported authentication result and relevant sanitized diagnostics |
| Signed-in user cannot perform an operation | Effective resource/action authority, group/profile membership | Allowed/denied test with the intended identity |
| Technical caller never reaches application code | API family, credential context and delivery-layer authorization | Request/response and the first observed rejection |
| Replication fails on protected content | Service identity, repository privileges and CUG evaluation | Exact deployment, affected policies and scoped test results |
| Control is hidden but another route permits the action | UI configuration versus backend enforcement | Tests of each relevant supported operation path |
| Content crosses an audience boundary | Endpoint fields, access enforcement and cache variation | Representative identity/response comparison and containment owner |
Record current effective membership before changing it. Otherwise a successful retest can be attributed to the new profile while an unrelated broad profile supplied the authority. Include service-account lifecycle, not just initial setup.
Worked scenario of regional publication rights
This hypothetical organization has two regional content teams, a shared library and an integration account. Regional publishers should publish their own market's approved content, read permitted shared assets and have no deployment authority. The integration may update agreed product facts but must not become a general publisher.
The platform and content owners define a capability matrix before implementation:
Scroll horizontally if needed.
| Identity | Required capability | Required exclusion |
|---|---|---|
| Regional author | Edit permitted regional content | Cannot publish or change protected shared facts |
| Regional publisher | Publish approved regional scope | Cannot publish another region or deploy code |
| Shared-content owner | Govern shared facts and dependencies | No implied environment administration |
| Integration account | Perform the documented update operation within its contract | No arbitrary content mutation or unintended publication |
| Deployment role | Run the required release process | No broader environment authority merely for convenience |
The owner tests actual actions and relevant alternative routes, not only visible buttons. Tests include a permitted page, another region's page, a shared dependency, a denied API operation, an expired credential and the target approval state. The team also reviews all assigned product profiles.
Suppose regional publication works, but an API route still lets the regional publisher affect another region. Hiding that region's console entry does not repair the authorization failure. The release is held while the relevant backend rule/profile assignment is corrected and all affected paths are retested.
Separately, the integration's update request fails before its application service identity is invoked. The team investigates the documented API/credential setup rather than granting that internal identity administrator membership. This follows the boundary exposed in the App Builder discussion, without adopting its unverified scope suggestions.
Evaluate protected-content changes across their real scope
Scroll horizontally if needed.
| Proposed change | Question the owner must answer | Required retest |
|---|---|---|
| Add group/profile membership | Which cumulative authority changes? | Intended and unintended resources/actions |
| Change a CUG exclusion | Which policies/identities does this affect? | Protected-content access plus repository permissions |
| Disable an editor feature | Is this usability configuration or enforced authority? | Backend routes and alternate UI paths |
| Alter CORS/CSRF or edge filtering | Which request condition is failing? | Legitimate requests and denied conditions without blanket disabling |
| Expose an API field | Does this audience need the field? | Actual responses, errors and cache behavior |
For LTS, use the CUG reference; its documented property name is not interchangeable with a guessed name in a reply. For Cloud Manager, use resource-scoped custom permissions. For Universal Editor, use its current customization reference while keeping authorization tests separate.
Make access an operated service
Record who approves access, provisions it, reviews changes, revokes it and responds to suspected exposure. Include agency departures, job changes and service credential rotation. Keep security/privacy assessment and contractual obligations with the appropriate owners; an access matrix alone does not establish compliance.
The business owner signs off the intended authority and exposed information. Technical owners retain effective membership, request evidence and both successful and denied tests. Any temporary exception needs a scope, owner, expiry/review date and compensating operational arrangement that the responsible teams explicitly accept.
Prove both allowed and denied behavior
Complete W08 with identity, resource, action, approval requirement, backend enforcement and test result. Include unauthorized access, expired/revoked credentials, unintended field exposure and sensitive-content caching in the test set. Business owners approve who should access the information; technical owners demonstrate enforcement. Escalate contractual, privacy and legal questions to their responsible teams. A successful access test is not a security certification, and general reassurance in the fragment-governance discussion does not establish a safe implementation.
W08 Capability and data exposure
Use with chapter 8. Create a test entry for each meaningful identity/resource/action combination.
Scroll horizontally if needed.
| Record | Entry |
|---|---|
| Identity/groups/profiles and cumulative assigned authority | [enter] |
| Resource/path, action and approval requirement | [enter] |
| Authentication and backend authorization enforcement | [enter] |
| UI behavior and separate allowed/denied route tests | [enter] |
| Public/private fields, cache isolation and sensitive-data destinations | [enter] |
| Credential lifecycle and security/privacy escalation owners | [enter] |
